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Becoming Stateless: Historical Experience and
Its Refl ection on the Concept of State among the Lahu
in Yunnan and Mainland Southeast Asian Massif
Kataoka Tatsuki*
This paper aims to contribute to James Scott’s discussion of statelessness in “Zomia”
by examining the realities of political autonomy and the concepts of state and king-
ship of the Lahu.  During the nineteenth century, “kings” appeared among the Lahu
in parts of southwest Yunnan.  Indeed, the Lahu enjoyed political autonomy under
their own kings before these were eliminated in the process of modern state forma-
tion and border demarcation in China and Burma.  Messianic movements emerged
among the Lahu after they became stateless.  These movements stressed the need
to redeem the lost states and kings throughout the course of the Lahu’s modern
history.  In this respect, statelessness is not a timeless, quintessential attribute of 
the Lahu.  Rather, they only became conscious of statelessness during the modern
period.  What this demonstrates is that the Lahu have never been conscious anar-
chists who chose to avoid kings and states.  They possess their own original con-
cepts of state and kingship, even though these differ from our conventional under-
standing, and the main theme of their historical experience and mythical accounts
centers around their search for their own state and king.
Keywords: statelessness, Yunnan-Southeast Asian borderlands, Lahu, kingship, 
millenarianism
I Introduction
James Scott’s recent work The Art of Not Being Governed (J. C. Scott 2009) is an excellent 
contribution to studies on the massif of mainland Southeast Asia and southwest China 
(“Zomia” in his terminology).  Scott upholds that every aspect of social life of highlanders 
in this area can be seen as a conscious strategy to maintain distance from state power. 
He argues that their first priority was to avoid control from lowland states and that their 
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social organization, shifting cultivation, illiteracy, and origin myths were designed to 
justify statelessness in order to meet their ultimate goal of anarchy.
His argument is a part of the recent trend in this field to present a non-state-centered 
perspective.  Studies of this sort have appeared as opportunities for fieldwork have 
increased since China, Vietnam, and Laos (partly) opened their doors to foreign scholars.1)
Such studies have led to a re-evaluation of certain social dynamics that hitherto remained 
hidden from the modern state perspective.  James Scott’s book has made advances in this 
respect.
The Lahu, a Tibeto-Burman speaking group, are distributed over a wide area that
covers Upper Burma, northern Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, as well as their original land 
Yunnan.  According to James Scott, they are one of the typically stateless peoples of 
“Zomia.”  Indeed, their consciousness of being stateless is both an important motif in 
their origin myth and a main driving force behind a series of messianic movements.
However, whether statelessness reflects their consciousness is questionable.  In this
paper, I will present an alternative interpretation of their historical consciousness.  I first
discuss the Lahu’s political autonomy in southwest Yunnan during the nineteenth century
(Section II) and follow up by discussing arguments concerning the elimination of political
autonomy in the course of China’s building of a modern nation-state (Section III).  Next
I examine indigenous concepts of state and king, the origin myth that justifies stateless,
as well as the messianic movements that search for “the lost book” of the Lahu (Section
IV).  Finally, in the concluding section, I present possibilities for viewing “Zomia” from
an alternative perspective, which may open up ways of discussing the realities of states
run by highlanders and their original concept of statehood.
II The “Lahu Age”
Emergence of the Lahu Autonomous Polities
After a long period of “missing links” in their ethno-history,2) the Lahu (then known as
Luohei猓黒 or Kucong 苦葱 in Chinese documents) emerged in Chinese official records
of the Yongzheng 雍正 period.3)  Qing officials promoted an image of the Luohei or Kucong
as “unruly rebels,” and the “Luohei rebels” appeared again in the Jiaqing 嘉慶 period 
1) For example, see Giersch (2006) and Horstmann and Wadley (2006).
2) For the history of the Lahu before Qing, see “Lahuzu Jianshi” Bianxiezu (1986), Wang and He (1999),
Zhengxie Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui (2003).
3) Dianyun Linianchuan, Vol. 12, 621–624.  See also Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao Zouzhe, Vol. 7,
453–454, Vol. 20, 98 for details of the activities of the Luohei and Kucong.
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when they were accused of disobedience to the lowland Tay (Shan) cawfaa or military
native officials (tusi土司) owing allegiance to the Qing emperor.
Demographic, economic, and religious factors contributed to the appearance of the 
“rebels.”4)  The first factor to consider is the expansion of the Han migrant population in 
southwest Yunnan and Upper Burma during the eighteenth century.  According to the Draft 
Comprehensive Gazetteer of Yunnan, the population of Yongchang 永昌府 and Shunning 
順寧府 Prefectures, where the majority of the Lahu resided, increased from 166,962 in
1736 to 660,452 in 18305) due to the huge influx of Han migrants.  Highlanders were thus 
exposed to Han cultural influence.  The spread of Mahayana Buddhism over the Lahu
hills is a typical example (discussed below).
Rapid opening of mines in the Yunnan-Burma borderlands also attracted Han 
migrants.  Reid (2004, 24) summarizes the migration of Han Chinese miners:
[M]iners migrated in large numbers into Yunnan, where there were reported to be 500,000 miners 
by 1800.  The desire for further mining sites was not halted by any notional boundary of Chinese 
imperial control.  The hills in the north of what are today Burma, Laos, and Vietnam held similar 
resources of copper, lead, iron, and silver as those of Yunnan.  Chinese miners became far more 
numerous on all these frontiers in the eighteenth century, making deals as necessary with local or 
state power-holders.
Han mine owners maintained private armies and actively participated in local poli-
tics.  The most prominent figures were Wu Shangxian 呉尚賢 of Maolong 茂隆 silver 
mine and Gong Li-yan 宮里雁 of Bolong (Bawdwin) 波龍 silver mine.  The “Mian Kao
緬考” included in the Dian Xi of 1808 comments that these two mine owners were “most
feared by surrounding barbarians” along the Yunnan-Burma borderlands during the eight-
eenth century.  Another silver mine, Munai募乃, was located in the center of the Lahu
hills in today’s Lancang County瀾滄縣, and was also managed by Han Chinese.6)
At the same time, the Qing dynasty introduced gaitu guiliu改土歸流 policies, direct 
administration by imperial officials to replace indirect rule by military native officials (tusi)
in the eighteenth century.  This was actively implemented on the east bank of the Mekong
(Lancang) river during the Yongzheng period under the initiative of Ertai 鄂爾泰, the 
governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou.  The abolition of Tay native military officials
in Weiyuan 威遠 (present-day Jinggu 景谷) and Zhenyuan 鎭沅 during the 1720s was
4) See Ma (2004; 2007) and Takeuchi (2010) for details of Han immigrants to the Lahu hills, their 
impact on the local economy, and the transformation of ethnic relations, which eventually led to the 
creation of the Lahu semi-independent polities led by Han monks.
5) See Yunnan Tongzhi Gao, Vol. 56.
6) For details of the Chinese miners’ role in ethnic relations in the eighteenth-century Yunnan-Burma 
borderlands (including Munai), see Giersch (2006, 127–135).
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followed by a series of uprisings by displaced Tay former aristocrats in coalition with 
other highlanders including the Lahu.  The influx of Han Chinese migrants and the grow-
ing pressure of Qing’s direct administration by the Qing created a “middle ground” 
(Giersch 2006), or a field of competition over political power and economic resources
among the Han immigrants, lowland Tay, and surrounding highlanders in southwest 
Yunnan.
The second factor behind the emergence of the “Lahu rebels” was political unrest 
in Yunnan-upper mainland Southeast Asia during the eighteenth century.  Mine owners,
Han migrants, as well as local Tay cawfaa (Sën.Wii, Keng Tung, Mäng: Lëm孟連, Sipsong
Panna, Chiang Mai, etc.) actively participated in local politics along the Yunnan-Burma
frontiers at the time of dynasty change in Burma and Siam.  The new Siamese dynasty,
Thongburi-Bangkok, ousted Burmese troops from Chiang Mai and made a vassal state
of it.  The newly appointed Chiang Mai king, Kawila, mounted military expeditions to
Keng Tung and Sipsong Panna to bring back war captives to repopulate the Chiang Mai
valley.  The recently founded Burmese Konbaung dynasty also quickly reverted to an
expansionist policy that targeted the Tay Shan polities in the northeast.  It led to a trian-
gular struggle among Burmese troops, Tay polities, and the leaders of the Han Chinese
immigrants.  All of this occurred in the aftermath of the 1766–69 Qing-Konbaung War.
The Tay polities were the main battlefields in all of these conflicts.  In the course of 
such political turmoil, Tay cawfaa sometimes fought each other and sometimes banded
together in accordance with complex marriage alliances.  The Tay polities split into small
factions and their political prestige in the region was severely damaged (ibid., 97–124).
Highlanders served at the frontline as spies, guides, or (un)reliable support forces for
lowland cawfaa in inter-valley-state warfare.  Their service strengthened the highlanders’ 
powers of negotiation with lowland polities.  At the end of the eighteenth century, the
Lahu, who had formerly been subjects of the Tay cawfaa of Mäng: Lëm, Mäng Mäng猛
猛, etc., had already prepared to reject their suzerainty.7)
The third factor was Buddhism.  Reportedly some Kucong who revered a Theravada 
monk8) rebelled against Qing officials at Simao思茅 during the early eighteenth century. 
However, it was Mahayana Buddhism that became dominant among the Lahu on the 
7) The Lahu were no exception.  Sir J. George Scott points out that the slow decline of the Tay valley 
states in regional politics is due to heavy demands from neighboring superpowers (Burma and China) 
and endless fighting among valley states or factions, as well as to “the advances of the Kachins” 
(J. G. Scott 1900, 281).
8) It was mentioned that this monk was a mian seng 緬僧 (Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao Zouzhe, 
Vol. 20, 98). Mian literally means “Burmese” but in many cases this term simply serves as a synonym
for the Theravada school of Buddhism.  In this context, it is likely that he was a Tay.
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western bank of the Mekong.  According to Chinese publications on the Lahu, Mahayana
Buddhism was initially brought into the Lahu hills during the eighteenth century by a
Han Chinese monk from Dali 大理.  Before that, the Lahu were organized under a religio-
political leadership in which village priests were responsible for village administration.
Under the influence of Buddhism, this system was transformed into integrated multi-
village units headed by a foye佛爺 or monk.  The Lahu translated the Chinese term fo
(fu) 佛, which literally means the Buddha (or Buddha images), as G’ui sha, meaning the 
supreme creator god.  As Buddhism spread throughout the hills, the existing priest-
centered village leadership was modified to worship foye as living Buddhas or man-gods 
(Yunnansheng Xingzheng Gongshu Minwei 1990, 344–346).  A Dafoye (Ta Fu Ye) 大佛
爺, or senior foye, appointed junior monks in each village under his control.  This multi-
village theocracy inspired by Mahayana Buddhism enabled the Lahu to claim equal status 
with the Theravada Buddhist polities in the lowlands.
The Heyday of the “Lahu Age”
The people of Dong Zhu (Tong Chu)東主, where the Lahu Mahayana Buddhist tradition 
flourished in the nineteenth century, divide their history into two periods: the Lahu co-e
(“Lahu Age”) and the Heh pa co-e (“Chinese Age”).  The “Lahu Age” refers to the period 
up to the 1890s when their fu were active and enjoyed autonomy.  The “Chinese Age” 
commenced with the introduction of direct administration by the Qing government in 
1888.
Leading Lahu monks were known as fu jaw maw or “Buddha kings.”9)  The existence
of such “kings” provides the basis for present-day Lahu claims that they once possessed
their own king and state.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, Sir J. George Scott
(then superintendent of the Shan States) reported the existence of an independent Lahu
kingdom governed by a living Buddha, which he named the “Nan Cha Tong Chu King-
dom” after the location names of prominent monasteries (J. G. Scott 1900, 583).  He 
wrote: “In the Nan Cha Tong Chu Kingdom of the La’hus there were thirty-six of these
Fu and over them were set Ta Fu Ye or great Buddhas.”  This kingdom was established 
by a mythical leader named Kyan Sit Fu, who “appeared mysteriously and ordered the
construction of thirty-six Fu-fang or sacred (Buddhistic) houses.”  George Scott also 
noted that “when they were built he disappeared as suddenly as he came” (ibid., 583–
584).  This mythical account matches the data from surveys conducted by the Communist
government of China during the 1950s.  Chinese government reports mention that the
Lahu were once governed by a coalition of monks and monasteries called “36 zun fo三
9) See below for the meaning of the term jaw maw.
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十六尊佛 (respectful Buddhas)” (“Minzu Wenti Wuzhong Congshu,” Yunnansheng Bianji 
Weiyuanhui 1982, 14).10)  The coalition of monasteries was also known as the wu fo五佛
(five Buddhas).  The exact composition of the wu fo varies according to ethnographical 
authors,11) but most of them agree that Nan Zha (Nan Cha) 南柵 and Dong Zhu (Tong
Chu) were central figures.
The first “Buddha king” to appear in Chinese historical sources is Tong Jin 銅金
(Buddhist name) or Zhang Fuguo 張輔國 (lay name), who was supposed to be the first 
Nan Zha Fo南柵佛 (Nan Zha Buddha), in other words, the founder of the Nan Zha mon-
astery.  He was the son of a Han immigrant living in Mäng: Lem (Giersch 2006, 113), who 
taught martial arts and propagated Mahayana Buddhism in the Lahu hills (Yunnansheng
Shuangjiang Lahuzu Wazu Bulangzu Daizu Zizhixian Difangzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1995,
857).  He became notorious when he successfully instigated a Lahu rebellion against the
lowland Tay polities of Mäng Mäng (Shuangjiang 雙江) and Mäng: Lëm in 1799.  This
rebellion was eventually suppressed by Qing military intervention, though Tong Jin him-
self was released on the grounds that he was a monk with no political aspirations.12)
Tong Jin and his Lahu followers renewed hostilities against the Tay valley states in
1803 when they refused to pay tribute to the cawfaa of Mäng: Lëm.  The governor-
general of Yunnan and Guizhou sent officials to mediate the dispute between the Lahu
and the cawfaa.  Qing officials finally settled the issue by obliging Tong Jin to return to
secular life and by giving him a rank and title as a native official under the jurisdiction of 
Mäng: Lëm, responsible for collecting tax on behalf of the cawfaa.13)  However, the prob-
lem was far from resolved since Zhang Fuguo (Tong Jin’s secular name), with the support
10) Details of the beginnings of the 36 monasteries differ a little from J.G. Scott’s version.  According
to this survey report, Wang Foye 王佛爺 came to the Lahu mountains to spread Buddhism in the 
last years of the Daoguang 道光 period (1821–51).  Subsequently 36 monasteries were constructed 
as the community of followers grew.
11) For example, Lahuzu Shehui Lishi Diaocha lists Nan Zha Fo, Dong Zu (Dong Zhu) Fo 東祖佛, Wei 
Pan Fo 委盼佛, Guang Ming Fo 廣明佛, and Meng Ka (Mong Hka) Fo 勐卡佛 (“Minzu Wenti 
Wuzhong Congshu” Yunnansheng Bianji Weiyuanhui 1982, 72).  The Lahuzu Jianshi version
includes Ba Ka 垻卡, Nan Zha, Dong Lang東朗, Dong Zhu, and Bang Zang 邦蔵 (“Lahuzu Jianshi”
Bianxiezu 1986, 35).  According to Simao Shaosu Minzu, the wu fo consisted of Nan Zha Fo, Man
Da Fo 蠻大佛, Dong Zhu Fo, Wei Pan Fo, and Guang Ming Fo (Yunnansheng Xingzheng Gongshu
Minwei 1990, 344).  Lahuzu Wenhuashi lists Nan Zha Fo, Wang Foye Fo 王佛爺佛, Man Da Fo, 
Dong Zhu Fo, and Meng Ka (Mong Hka) Fo (Wang and He 1999, 200).  Lahuzushi provides yet 
another version of the wu fo, comprising Nan Zha Fo, Wang Foye Fo, Meng Nuo Fo勐糯佛, Dong 
Zhu Fo, and Wei Pa Fo 尾帕佛 (Zhengxie Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui 2003, 76).  Fang
Guoyu方國瑜, a Chinese historian and ethnologist, who travelled in the Lahu hills in 1930, published
a list of former wu fo that included Dang Jiao Fo 當角佛, Xian Guan Fo 賢官佛, Yong Pa Fo永怕
佛, Qing Zhang Fo慶章佛, and Dong Zhu Fo (Fang 2008, 111).
12) Qing Renzong Shilu, Vol. 65, 4–5.
13) Xincuan Yunnan Tongzhi, Vol. 176, 13–14.
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of his Lahu followers, remained disobedient to Mäng: Lëm and even continued to expand
their territory by secretly collecting hanjian 漢奸 (Han traitor) troops14) and attacking 
nearby Tay valley states.  In the end the governor-general decided that he could tolerate
their behavior no longer and ordered the Tay cawfaa of southwest Yunnan to deploy
troops to attack them.15)  The Lahu “Buddha Kingdom” was destroyed in 1813; however
this was only the beginning of the history of autonomy of the Lahu hills.
Yong Bao永保 and Wu Dajing 烏大經, Qing officials dispatched to settle the Lahu-
Mäng: Lëm dispute in 1803, described how the Lahu found demands from the cawfaa so 
unreasonable and arbitrary that they wished to be governed by Tong Jin instead of the
cawfaa, or else to pay taxes directly to the governor-general.  They commented that the
Lahu’s attitude toward Tong Jin was “extremely obedient” and that “Tong Jin claims that 
he is a monk, but, as seen by the reverence shown to him by the people, in reality he is
nothing less than a Tibetan Lama in yellow robe.”16)  These passages prove that he 
reigned over the Lahu as an absolute monarch.  A British colonial official made a similar
observation about the nature of the Lahu fu jaw maw in the twentieth century (see below).
After the defeat of Tong Jin and his Nan Zha monastery, the center of the Lahu Bud-
dhists moved southward to Dong Zhu,17) where Wang Foye王佛爺 and his disciple San 
Fo Zu (Sha Fu cu, A sha Fu cu, A teh Pu cu) 三佛祖 served as the fu jaw maw.  Wang 
Foye was a Han Chinese monk fluent in the Tay, Wa, and Lahu languages (Wang and He 
1999, 196–197).  He emerged as a prominent figure among the Lahu after the decline of 
Nan Zha’s power.  He claimed to be a huo fo活佛 (living Buddha) and appointed 12 monks
as headmen, who each administered the multiple villages under his jurisdiction (“Minzu 
Wenti Wuzhong Congshu” Yunnansheng Bianji Weiyuanhui 1982, 95–98).  Since Wang
Foye is also said to have been a founder of the “36 monasteries,”18) so Kyan Sit Fu, who 
appears in J.G. Scott’s historical description above, might be another name for him.
After the death of Wang Foye around 1850 (Wang and He 1999, 197), his disciple
San Fo Zu succeeded him as the most influential monk among the Lahu.  Residing in 
Dong Zhu, San Fo Zu preached round Xia Gaixin下改心 (in present-day Lancang).  Later, 
in 1874, he moved his base to Mäng Ka (Ximeng 西盟) where he gradually gained a strong 
following among the indigenous Wa people after having conquered them (Yunnansheng 
14) These Han troops were probably recruited from among the coolies working at the Munai silver 
mine (located at the center of the Lahu hills in present-day Lancang), which was closed in 1815.
15) The background to this military operation is well described and analyzed by Giersch (2006, 113–115).
16) Xincuan Yunnan Tongzhi, Vol. 176, 13–14.
17) A series of local monks succeeded Tong Jin as abbots of the Nan Zha monastery but none had his 
charisma (Zhengxie Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui 2003, 265).
18) See footnote 10).
KATAOKA T.76
Ximeng Wazu Zizhixianzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1997, 261, 395; Yunnansheng Xingzheng 
Gongshu Minwei 1990, 344).
The Lahu Cultural History relates that the Dong Zhu monastery was destroyed in 
1874 during the Panthay rebellion (Wang and He 1999, 198).  However it seems that
Dong Zhu recovered quickly.  During the 1880s, Dong Zhu Da Fofang東主大佛房 (Dong 
Zhu Great Monastery) was listed among the “tucheng土城 (native fortifications)” by Cen 
Yuying岑毓英, the incumbent governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou (Cen 2005, 375).
Li Tongming (Mäng Hka Fu/Meng Ka Fo) 李通明, the husband of San Fo Zu’s 
daughter, succeeded to the position of Mäng Hka Fu (Meng Ka Fo or Ximeng Fo) when
his father-in-law San Fo Zu died in 1888.19)  At the turn of the century, Li Tongming was
the sole remaining “Buddha king” in the Yunnan-Burma borderlands.  Li Tongming 
appears in J. G. Scott’s Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States as the Ta Fu Ye of 
Mäng Hka who inherited the tradition of the Nan Cha Tong Chu Kingdom.  He observes
that “[t]he name Ta Fu Ye and the sacred character of its bearer, as has been said, sug-
gest the Lamas of Tibet, or rather the Dalai Lama, for the ordinary Lama is nothing more 
than a Buddhist monk” (J. G. Scott 1900, 584).  However, this tradition did not last long. 
After Li Tongming’s death in 1901, Ca sheh 扎謝 served as regent to Li’s young son.
Promoted from the position of a private servant in the Li family, Ca sheh had never
been ordained as a monk and, naturally enough, had not received a Buddhist education.
Reportedly the tradition of Buddhism in Ximeng (Mäng Hka) declined during his period
 (Yunnansheng Ximeng Wazu Zizhixianzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1997, 396).
Ca bo taiye扎布太爺 was a contemporary of San Fo Zu.  After an apprenticeship in 
Nan Zha, he established a monastery in his village Meng Nuo 勐糯 and served as the 
abbot or foye.  His prestige grew as the number of his followers swelled.  He then returned
to secular life to marry the daughter of a village headman and ruled 16 subordinate 
 villages.  The headmen of the villages under his control paid tribute to him annually.  He
had formed alliances with San Fo Zu and Nan Zha Fo, and together they were known as
the “san fo三佛” (three Buddha [kings]) in the late nineteenth century (Yunnansheng
Xingzheng Gongshu Minwei 1990, 350–351).
Wei Xiang魏相, a founder of Man Da Fu蠻大佛, was also listed as one of the five
wu fo of the Lahu even though he was a Wa.  Wei Xiang received training from Nan Zha 
Fo before he went to Dali for further Buddhist education.  Returning to Man Da, he 
established a monastery and, by virtue of his position as the Ta Fu Ye, had 20 subordinate
19) This indicates that both monks San Fo Zu and Li Tongming were married.  The fact that this appar-
ent violation of the Buddhist precept did not undermine their religious charisma reflects some
degree of transformation of original Buddhism (see Du 2003).
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abbots and 360 lesser monks under his jurisdiction (Yunnansheng Lancang Lahuzu
 Zizhixianzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1996, 152).  The Newly Compiled Comprehensive Gazetteer 
of Yunnan (Xincan Yunnan Tongzhi) commented that he was one of the three outstand-
ing leaders of southwest Yunnan during the nineteenth century, the other two being the 
Wa Gourd King (Huluwang葫蘆王) and the cawfaa of Mäng: Lëm.20)  The emergence of 
the authority of Man Da Fu among the local Lahu and Wa made them reject submission
to Shang Yun上允, a vassal Tay state of Mäng: Lëm (Wang and He 1999, 197–198).
Apart from the “Buddha kings” mentioned above, there were more secular native
leaders active in the Lahu hills during the later half of the nineteenth century.  The Newly
Compiled Comprehensive Gazetteer of Yunnan (Xincan Yunnan Tongzhi) mentioned the 
emergence of a galaxy of native forces in the Lahu hills during the Guangxu光緒 period 
(1875–1909).  This group comprised Zhang Dengfa張登發 (Zhang taiye張太爺), the son
of a Han migrant; Shi Zhaolong 石朝龍, Shi Zhaofeng 石朝鳳, Shi Tingzi 石廷子, Li
Zhilong李芝隆—all of whom were immigrants from Weiyuan威遠 on the east bank of 
the Mekong; and Li Zhaolong李朝龍, a migrant from Pu’er普洱.21)  Later Zhang Dengfa
became the target of a military expedition by the Qing army, while the other emerging 
native leaders were given titles as military native officials by the Qing government.
Zhang Dengfa succeeded his father Zhang Bingquan張秉權, who established himself 
as a semi-independent ruler of Shang Gaixin 上改心 (today’s Shuangjiang County) 
(Yunnansheng Shuangjiang Lahuzu Wazu Bulangzu Daizu Zizhixian Difangzhi Biancan 
Weiyuanhui 1995, 857–858).22)  Zhang Bingquan is reported to have been the son of Zhang 
Fuguo (Tong Jin) (ibid., 806).23)  Ensconced in the Shang Gaixin hills, Zhang Bingquan 
and Zhang Dengfa rejected the overlordship of the cawfaa of Mäng Mäng and continuously 
occupied villages from the territories of Mäng Mäng and other surrounding Tay valley 
states.  They established a centralized hierarchy of administration with the jaw maw at 
the top.  The jaw maw divided his territory into tax-collecting zones and appointed a 
changye掌爺 to supervise each village cluster (Shuangjiang Lahuzu Wazu Bulangzu Daizu 
Zizhixian Minzu Shiwu Weiyuanhui 1995, 40–41, 264–265).  Zhang’s hill dynasty over-
whelmed the Mäng Mäng cawfaa and encroached on his territory despite repeated warn-
ings from Qing officials in 1883–84.24)
20) Xincuan Yunnan Tongzhi, Vol. 176, 24.
21) ibid.
22) According to Lahuzu Shi, Zhang Bingquan was a younger brother of Zhang Dengfa’s father (Zhengxie
Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui 2003, 69).
23) Lahuzu Shi remains silent on this point.  It mentions nothing about the relationship between Zhang
Fuguo and Zhang Bingquan.
24) Fu Dian Zouyi, Vol. 1.
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Among other native leaders of the Guangxu period, Li Zhilong and the Shi brothers 
 (Zhaolong and Zhaofeng) are credited in the Draft of the Continued Comprehensive Gazetteer 
of Yunnan (Xu Yunnan Tongzhi Gao) with rendering military assistance to the Qing 
during the Panthay rebellion.25)  This corresponds to the fact that Simao was recovered 
by Qing troops in 1865 with military assistance from local reinforcements from the Lahu
hills (Yunnansheng Simao Xian Difangzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1993, 371).  They may
have been serving as pro-Qing militia even before being granted official titles as native
military officials.
III Decline of the “Lahu Age” and the Aftermath
Collapse of Autonomy
The period of flourishing semi-independent “Buddha kings” and other secular leaders
came to a close at the end of the nineteenth century during the course of the transforma-
tion of the Qing Empire into a modern state.
The sudden elimination of the kingdom of Burma in 1885 and the British annexation 
of Upper Burma in the following year caused serious problems for Qing officials.  They
had to defend Yunnan from the British, but nobody knew exactly where Yunnan ended
and Upper Burma began.  Tay (Shan) valley states lay between China and Burma, and
the question of sovereignty over these states was an extremely complex one.  Some of 
these states were vassal states of Burma, others were ruled by military native officials
(tusi) appointed by China, and some states paid tribute to both.26)  As a result, the British
claimed territorial rights over some of the Tay military native officials in Yunnan.  Indeed, 
in the demarcation of the territory of British Burma, the British set extreme eastern 
limits to Burma’s tributary states and “claimed the following eastern tributary states as
falling within Ava’s domains and having paid tribute to her: Hsenwi (Sën.Wii), Kokang,
Kungma (Mäng: Küng), Monglem (Mäng: Lëm), Kenghung and the Lahu hills between
the last two” (Saimong 1965, 275).  Thus, for the Qing it was of vital importance to prove
that the valley states in question were in fact “Chinese” local administrative units.
Here lay another serious problem.  The administrative power of Tay cawfaas was 
confined to the small valleys scattered throughout southwest Yunnan, and their sover-
eignty over the hills surrounding such valleys was at most nominal.  Indeed, as we have
seen, some of the Lahu leaders were even hostile to the valley cawfaas.  In short, the 
25) Xu Yunnan Tongzhi Gao, Vol. 98.
26) See Saimong (1965) for an analysis of this complex situation.
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system of indirect administration in which native officials ruled over feudal territory on
behalf of the Qing court had failed.
The Qing policy of securing sovereignty over territory on the Yunnan-Burma fron-
tier was to encroach on the domains of weakened Tay valley states and grant native 
official (tusi) titles to nominally subordinate upland leaders.  This policy was originally
intended to target the Kachin (Jingpo), but was also applied to the Lahu.27)  Pro-Qing
figures among the Xia Gaixin (present-day Lancang) Lahu such as Li Zhilong, Shi 
 Zhaolong, Shi Zhaofeng, etc., were given titles of lower rank such as native lieutenants
(tuqianzong土千總), native second lieutenants (tubazong土把總), native second captains 
(tushoubei土守備), and native brigade vice-commanders (tudusi土都司), in 1886 (Fang 
1987, 882).  This measure was aimed at isolating Zhang Dengfa, who was most hostile
to Qing authority.  In the following year, Cen Yuying, the governor-general of Yunnan
and Guizhou, sent troops to attack the stronghold of Zhang Dengfa, with newly appointed 
Lahu native officials assisting in the operation.  The Qing army eventually killed Zhang
Dengfa and occupied his territory.  After the completion of this operation, the Qing 
established Zhenbian sub-prefecture (ting)鎭邊直隷廰 as an organ to administer directly
the new territory in the Lahu hills in 1888.28)
In a report of the victory of the military expedition submitted to the emperor, the
governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou, Cen Yuying (2005, 403), summarized the
political development of the Lahu hills throughout the nineteenth century very simply
as “endless rebellion (lushi panluan屢世叛亂).”  This reveals a huge gap between the
statements by Qing officials and Lahu perceptions of themselves.  From the viewpoint 
of Qing officials, the “Lahu Age,” in which the Lahu resisted submission to the Qing, was
simply a rebellion against a legitimate state power.
The forces of the five “Buddha kings” (wu fo) led by Dong Zhu and Mäng Hka con-
tinued to resist surrendering to the Zhenbian sub-prefecture.  San Fo Zu of Mäng Hka
died in 1888, the same year as the Qing started to directly administer the Lahu hills
(Yunnansheng Ximeng Wazu Zizhixianzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1997, 261).  Three years
later, the forces of the “barbarians of the five monasteries (Wu Fofang Yi 五佛房夷)” 
attacked the Zhenbian army.29)  Since this movement was centered around Dong Zhu and
Mäng Hka, Qing troops destroyed the Dong Zhu Fofang.  Meanwhile Li Tongming sur-
rendered to the Qing and was appointed as the Ximeng tumu西盟土目, a low-ranking
native official (ibid., 395–396; Yunnansheng Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixianzhi Biancan 
27) Yunnan Tongzhi, Vol. 114.
28) Xincuan Yunnan Tongzhi, Vol. 176, 25.
29) Xu Yunnan Tongzhi Gao, Vol. 84.
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 Weiyuanhui 1996, 462).  The entire Lahu hills in Yunnan then came under the control of 
the Qing and thus ended the “Lahu Age.”
However, the Lahu polities should not be understood in the modern sense of inter-
national relations, which are based on the notion of sovereign states.  The Lahu polities
were nominally under the suzerainty of the Tay valley states; hence, they were vassals
from the official viewpoint of Chinese emperors and Burmese kings.  In addition, some
Lahu “Buddha kings” were subordinate to the Wa chiefs as well.  Ca bo taiye is reported 
to have refused to pay tax to a neighboring Wa chief and to have established an alliance
with the Wa on equal terms.  This indicates that the Lahu in that area paid tax to the Wa
and therefore were subordinate to them before the time of Ca bo (Yunnansheng  Xingzheng 
Gongshu Minwei 1990, 350–351).  San Fo Zu (and his successor Li Tongming) conquered
Mäng Hka (Ximeng) and ruled over the Wa living there.  However, San Fo Zu and Li
Tongming’s “kingdom” still remained subordinate to a neighboring Wa chief named Sung 
Ramang, paying annual tribute to him (J. G. Scott 1901, 360).  This is an important point 
for understanding the local concepts of state and kingship, which are different from 
 present-day notions of modern nation states (discussed below).
Zhenbian sub-prefecture was proof that the Lahu hills were under Qing administra-
tion, so the British abandoned the annexation of Zhenbian as well as Mäng: Lëm and 
Sipsong Panna.30)  Finally both Qing China and British India agreed on the demarcation 
of the Yunnan-Burma border in 1894, with the exception of some parts of the Wa area.31)
The transformation of the pre-modern regional order into a world governed by the prin-
ciples of modern international relations eliminated any possibility of the Lahu surviving 
with their own country.  Nonetheless, their concept of state and kingship persisted and
was expressed in the repeated religious movements and rebellions that arose thereafter.
Emerging Messianic Movements
Studies on Lahu religious history agree that the messianic movements, which started at
the end of the nineteenth century, originated from a prophecy by San Fo Zu.  According
to Gordon Young, the prophetic tradition can be traced to a message that San Fo Zu left
on his deathbed in 1888 in which he instructed the Lahu to “burn the beeswax candles
and joss-sticks, that the day might soon come when the Lahu people will receive their 
enlightenment from God” (G. Young 1962, 11).
30) Actually the British government sent a series of delegations to Mäng: Lëm, Sipsong Panna, and 
Mäng Hka (Ximeng) to ask for their submission (Saimong 1965, 200–288; Mitton 1936, 187–189).
31) Mäng Hka (Ximeng) was included in these unsettled areas.  For details of border demarcation, and 
debates between China and British India over the legal status of Mäng: Lëm and Sipsong Panna, 
see Saimong (1965, 275–291).
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Paul Lewis, a Baptist missionary and anthropologist, argues that San Fo Zu was also 
the founder of Lahu millenarianism: “Messianic movements among Lahus in Burma have
been going on for many years.  The Lahus say it really started with Sha fu cu, and the
power has been handed down from one to the other” (Lewis 1970, 88).
Indeed, the unsuccessful rebellion of the “barbarians of the five monasteries” against 
Zhenbian sub-prefecture in 1891, in which San Fo Zu’s son-in-law played a central role
in the alliance with the Dong Zhu Fo, was a direct result of this prophecy.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the longing for a messiah became wide-
spread among the Lahu in Yunnan and even among those in the Shan States, Burma. 
Antisdel, another Baptist missionary at Keng Tung, wrote of such enthusiasm.  The Lahu
there widely believed that:
God, Himself, was to appear and reinstate them supernaturally.  A false leader has here and there 
appeared claiming to be God and urging the people to abandon the “old” and take up the “new,” 
to obey him and when the time comes he would “manifest” himself and exert his supernatural 
 powers, when all manner of blessings—chiefly temporal—should be heaped upon the people with 
no effort on their part; they would rule over their present oppressors, sickness and, of course, 
death, would be no more.  Several of these false prophets have had a considerable following. 
 (Antisdel 1911, 35)
Prophetic uprisings by the Lahu arose continuously in Yunnan, the Shan States, and
eventually in Thailand.
In 1903, a group of the Lahu of Mäng Mäng (Shuangjiang) led by “yaoren妖人” (a
miraculous person) and “xianren仙人” (probably an immortal, unworldly person) revolted 
against the cawfaa of Mäng Mäng, but was suppressed by Qing forces.32)  During the
rebellion, the people gathered at a Fo-fang (monastery) for New Year dancing, and
 “magical water” was distributed by the leaders before the uprising.
Two years later, The News (a monthly journal of the American Baptists) reported 
that among the Lahu of Keng Tung, “one man claims to be a messianic king, that he is
to give immortality to all, and that there will be no more wars” (W. M. Young 1905a, 11).
In 1918, the Lahu brothers Li Long李龍 and Li Hu李虎 of Yunnan instigated their
brethren to rise up against usurious practices and government officials (Yunnansheng
Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixianzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1996, 560–561).  One Lahu leader, 
who joined the insurrection after visiting Dong Zhu and other Fo-fang, then claimed to 
be God (Zhengxie Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui 2003, 85).  The people revolted
32) Shunning Fuzhi, Vol. 17.  For details, see Shuangjiang Lahuzu Wazu Bulangzu Daizu Zizhixian Minzu 
Shiwu Weiyuanhui (1995, 45–48).
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with the slogan “Our lord has appeared!”  This rebellion spread all over the Lahu hills in
Yunnan before being suppressed by Yunnan provincial troops (“Minzu Wenti Wuzhong
Congshu” Yunnansheng Bianji Weiyuanhui 1982, 80–81).
Messianic movements have also arisen among the Lahu in Burma and Thailand.33)
Lewis described one instance as follows:
In 1934 the Lahu “prophet” named Ma heh G’ui sha raised an army to fight the British.  The latest 
leader of significance to Lahus in Thailand is Maw na pa, or sometimes called Paw ku lon, living 
just across the border from Thailand.  In 1958 he sent word that no Lahu was to live any further 
south in Thailand than Fang.  Those who would come up to live in Burma, he said, would have 
“everlasting food and drink,” and thus many villages went up there.  Many of them have become 
discouraged and returned to Thailand. (Lewis 1970, 88)
Another example is that of Maw na to bo, or Maw na pa, who was one of the warlords 
in the ethnic insurgency in Burma.  He purportedly established his army by collecting
money from ordination ceremonies for religious specialists under his rule, and proclaimed 
his territory a Lahu mvuh mi (state).  His claim attracted the Lahu in Burma, who were
under strong pressure from the government army, Shan separatist armies, and Burmese 
Communist Party guerrillas, as well as his brethren who suffered oppression under the 
military rule of the ex-KMT troops in the hills of northern Thailand (Sombat 2002).
Till today the Lahus’ quest for a new charismatic leader has not ended.  Once a 
powerful man with mysterious power appears, rumors spread across national boundaries 
immediately.  A good example is Khruba Bunchum, a Thai charismatic monk living near
the Golden Triangle (Thai-Lao-Burmese border).34)  His Lahu followers consider him to 
be a reincarnation of San Fo Zu and Maw na to bo (Kataoka 2007).
All these cases indicate that the messianic movements of the Lahu should be viewed 
as a reaction to serious deprivations suffered after the demise of the “Lahu Age” and 
incorporation into modern nation states, rather than as an everlasting essential feature
of highlanders’ identity.
IV The Making of “Statelessness”
State and Kingship
The Lahus’ claim that they once had kings and countries of their own actually has some
33) See Walker (1974) for a brief summary of such movements up to the 1970s.
34) Cohen (2000) mentions Bunchum’s movement, which crosses national and ethnic boundaries, and
the Lahu’s involvement in it.
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grounds.  If so, what are the indigenous concepts that correspond to the notion of coun-
try (or state) and king?  The Lahu words mvuh mi and jaw maw refer to “country” and 
“king” respectively.
Lewis, in his Lahu-English-Thai Dictionary, defines mvuh mi as “a country, a nation” 
(Lewis 1986, 232).35)  However, this term sometimes denotes territories other than 
modern nation states.  For example, Lancang Lahu Autonomous County in present-day
Yunnan is called Lancang Lahu Mvuh mi.  The Shan States within Burma and the Wa
substate in the Shan States are called Pi chaw (Shan) Mvuh mi and A va (Wa) Mvuh mi
respectively.  Village clusters can also be called mvuh mi.36)  Regardless of the issue of 
sovereignty, the term mvuh mi can be used to denote almost all geographical territories; 
however, while it is true that mvuh mi does refer to a country or state, it should be noted
that it has a wider range of meaning than these English terms.
Jaw maw appears as a translation for “lord” and “ruler” in Lewis’ dictionary (ibid., 
154).  Heads of state, monarchs, and presidents are all referred to as jaw maw.  Like mvuh
mi, the term jaw maw also carries a much broader meaning than the simple notion of 
conventional kings of independent states.  Rulers subordinate to higher authority such
as the cawfaa of Mäng: Lëm and Keng Tung are known as jaw maw.  Some heads of local 
administrative units are also referred to as jaw maw.  This term is used for the head of 
Lancang Lahu Autonomous County, district heads under his jurisdiction, and some dis-
trict heads and warlords in Burma and Thailand.
In Chinese, jaw maw (juo mo) is translated as taiye太爺, supreme ruler of the Lahu. 
One example of a Lahu leader who held the taiye title is Zhang Dengfa (Yunnansheng 
Shuangjiang Lahuzu Wazu Bulangzu Daizu Zizhixian Difangzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1995,
806).  A close reading of materials mentioning former Lahu leaders reveals other 
instances.  Li Zhilong, a pro-Qing native leader and contemporary of Zhang Dengfa,
“proclaimed himself a king and was called San Lao taiye三老太爺 or San Laohu三老虎” 
(Yunnansheng Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixianzhi Biancan Weiyuanhui 1996, 461).  Ca bo taiye
in Meng Nuo (see above) was another jaw maw among the Lahu Buddhists during the
nineteenth century.
Apart from Ca bo himself, as already mentioned above, fu in the nineteenth century 
were generally called fu jaw maw or “Buddha kings.”  One such king was “Ta Fu Ye 
(Dafoye)” of “Nan Cha Tong Chu (Nan Zha Dong Zhu) Kingdom” described in George
Scott’s report.  Actually, Wang Foye and San Fo Zu were accorded the taiye title as well 
35) Literally, the term means “heaven (mvuh) and earth (mi).”
36) Meh na hko, a village cluster in Thailand (Chiang Rai province, Mae Suai district), where I conducted 
fieldwork for three years, is called Meh na hko Mvuh mi.
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(Wang and He 1999, 195–200; Zhengxie Lancang Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui 2003,
269).
There is evidence that even bandit leaders can be enthroned as kings in the people’s
memory.  Ca na扎那, a bandit leader on the east bank of the Mekong who fought against 
direct administration by the Qing at the end of the eighteenth century, was posthumously 
given the title of “Lahu King (Luohei Wang猓黒王)” (Zhengxie Lancang Lahuzu  Zizhixian
Weiyuanhui 2003, 54–56).
In the tradition of messianic movements after San Fo Zu (that is after the end of the
“Lahu Age”), we still come across many kings or jaw maw in early twentieth-century 
accounts.  In 1904 a mass conversion to Christianity occurred in Keng Tung when the
arrival of a Christian missionary was interpreted as a fulfillment of San Fo Zu’s prophecy
(see below).  The American Baptist missionary was granted the “Squatter Sovereignty
right to the territory” by the Lahu.37)  Although the Lahu term for the English translation 
“Squatter Sovereignty” was unfortunately not given in the missionary correspondence,
it is quite likely that the term originally used was jaw maw.  At the same time as the mass 
conversion in Keng Tung, the appearance of another “messianic king” was reported 
(W. M. Young 1905a, 11).  The slogan of the 1918 rebellion in Yunnan, “Our lord has 
appeared (Women de zhuzi chulaile我們的主子出來了)!”, is no doubt a direct translation
of jaw maw.  Later, in Burma in the 1970s, a Lahu man-god Maw na G’ui sha (Maw na 
pa, Maw na to bo) was reported to have been called jaw maw by his followers (Walker 
1974, 704).
What these cases demonstrate is that the Lahu have never been conscious anar-
chists who chose to avoid kings and states.  On the contrary, their subjective history 
abounds in stories of kings.  They have had concepts of state and kingship of their own, 
and such notions are by no means alien to them.  Indeed, in the broadest sense of the 
terms, sometimes they actually ran states and had kings of their own in the past.
The Lahu Myths of Statelessness Reconsidered
The fact that the subjective history of the Lahu overflows with stories of kings may seem 
inconsistent with another subjective history that focuses on their statelessness.  Like 
other highlanders of Southeast Asia, the origin myth of the Lahu contains very rich texts 
that rationalize their statelessness.  However, this manifestation of statelessness requires 
close scrutiny.  Let us start by looking at this myth.
It relates that the god created heaven and earth and then created humans beside the 
lake of Naw sheh Naw law (or Naw law Naw sheh).  The god gave the Lahu a seal of office 
37) This will be discussed in the following subsection.
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to rule the world and other ethnic groups became servants of the Lahu.  The envious Tay
(Shan) sent a beautiful servant girl to tempt the Lahu jaw maw with her costume and 
gestures.38)  The jaw maw accidentally touched her breast and, as plotted, the Tay servant 
girl cried out and asked for the god’s seal as compensation.  Because she would accept
nothing else, the Lahu jaw maw finally gave it to her.  From that time onwards the Lahu 
lost their title and became subjects and servants of the Tay (Pun and Lewis 2002, 29–31;
Kya leh 1994, 5).
According to the Lahu origin myth, the Lahu formerly ruled the entire world from
their capital at Beijing/Nanjing.39)  These cities were surrounded by walls.  The Han 
Chinese were one of the subject ethnic groups ruled by Lahu jaw maw.  At that time, the
Lahu, armed with crossbows, possessed the strongest army.  The Chinese had never
been able to defeat them in battle, so they played a trick on the Lahu women.  Attracted
by the sound of Jew’s harps, the Lahu women gave all the triggers of the crossbows to
the Chinese while their husbands were away farming and hunting.  Thus fully armed, the
Chinese soldiers attacked the city.  The Lahu men tried to fight back but found that their
crossbows could not work.  After losing the war, the Lahu left the capital city and took 
to the forest in search of a new country.  They chased the tracks of a deer and eventually
found a new place beside the lake of Naw sheh Naw law (Kya leh 1994, 10–11; Pun and
Lewis 2002, 32–34).
They lived in harmony in the country of Naw sheh Naw law.  Later, however, two
groups among the Lahu quarrelled over the distribution of game.  This quarrel divided 
the Lahu and 99 dissatisfied families left the country and moved south.  The remaining
33 families tried to pursue the 99 families but could not catch up with them.  Giving up
the chase, the 33 families settled in a new country, Mvuh meh Mi meh (Kya leh 1994,
11–12; Pun and Lewis 2002, 34–36; Antisdel 1911, 33).40)
The Han Chinese attacked Mvuh meh Mi meh.  Eventually the Lahu lost their new
38) In the English version translated by Pun and Lewis (2002), “jaw maw” is translated as “ruler.”
39) Peke Naje (Pun and Lewis 2002, 31) or Peu Cin Na Cin (Kya leh 1994, 10).  Pun and Lewis comment
that perhaps these terms refer to Beijing and Nanjing respectively.  Kya leh’s spelling looks closer
to the original Chinese pronunciation (with Lahu accent) of Beijing-Nanjing.  This interpretation
contradicts an implicit assumption among Chinese ethnologists that these terms do not refer to
Beijing and Nanjing but to old place names in Qinghai (Beiji 北基 and Nanji 南基) (Zhengxie Lancang
Lahuzu Zizhixian Weiyuanhui 2003, 21).  However, given their claim that the Lahu were once rul-
ers of China, it would be meaningless if their capital were located in small villages in isolated Qing-
hai.  It is most plausible that such views constitute a kind of “political decision” designed to mini-
mize ethnic conflict in contemporary China.  Ma (2008; 2009) also makes similar criticisms of this
unrealistic political discourse that pinpoints Qinghai as the Lahu homeland.
40) Mvuh meh Mi meh is supposed to be an old Lahu name for present-day Lincang 臨滄 (“Lahuzu
Jianshi” Bianxiezu 1986, 26).
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country and were forced to move further south.  Some of them founded the Sha K’ai Shi
country (Shang Gaixin, a former name for the hills of Shuangjiang county where Zhang
Dengfa was based), but it was eliminated by Chinese troops when the British colonized 
Burma.  Since then there have been no more Lahu jaw maw (Pun and Lewis 2002, 36–37). 
At first sight, these narratives seem to relate the prehistory of the Lahu.  However, in
reality, it is likely that these myths reflect the relatively recent political situation after
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Humans were first created at Naw sheh Naw law; later they also founded Naw sheh 
Naw law as a new country after having lost the war with the Chinese at Beijing/Nanjing.
One possible interpretation is that the passages concerning Beijing/Nanjing area were
later interpolated to the original version so that Naw sheh Naw law could be mentioned
in the myth as a new country.  The claim that Beijing/Nanjing was once the capital of the
Lahu makes no sense until the incorporation of the Lahu hills into Chinese territory after 
the 1880–90s.  Since the Lahu originally regarded themselves as non-subjects of the 
Chinese empire, there should have been no need for them to assert sovereignty over the
Chinese capital.
Second, the concept of superior rulers granting seals of office to local chiefs as proof 
of their investiture reflects a formality associated with the Chinese empire’s appointment 
of native officials (tusi).  Chinese dynasties always issued seals of office to local indigenous 
leaders whom they appointed to administrate areas that the dynasty was incapable of 
ruling directly in pre-modern China.  The Tay cawfaa of Mäng: Lam猛朗 (present-day 
Lancang Ba瀾滄壩) where the Lahu live was incorporated into the native official system
of the Qing dynasty during the late eighteenth century.  The legend of the “lost seal”
could be an imitation of administrative changes in the early modern period.
Third, in the former Lahu country, Mvuh meh Mi meh (present-day Lincang), direct 
administration by Qing dynasty was introduced during the middle of the eighteenth cen-
tury, after which many Han Chinese migrated to southwest Yunnan (see above).  Without
the presence of Han immigrants, Han Chinese would never have been portrayed in the
myth as rivals who threatened Lahu political autonomy.  It is possible that the “loss of 
Mvuh meh Mi meh” corresponded to changes in the ethnoscape during the eighteenth
century.
Consideration of these issues leads us to an alternative interpretation of the myths.
According to their own accounts, the Lahu started to rationalize their notions of stateless-
ness in relation to the Tay valley states and the Chinese bureaucracy no earlier than the
eighteenth century.  Their concepts of state, sovereignty, and power seem to have been
inspired by the influx of migrant Han Chinese in the early modern period.  Consciousness 
of “statelessness” itself emerged after the Lahu came under the administration of the
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Chinese state.41)  Statelessness as an active ideology for the articulation of ethnic 
 consciousness cannot predate the formation of a modern state with demarcated border-
lines.  If our understanding is correct, the Lahu were made stateless by the modern state
itself.
“The Lost Book” and Political Power
If statelessness is not a timeless, quintessential attribute of the Lahu, then James Scott’s
argument that their narratives of illiteracy served as “weapons of the weak”42) to avoid
the state also becomes questionable.  He argues that illiteracy (or “non-literacy” as he 
terms it) and myths of “the lost book” of the “Zomia” highlanders reflected a conscious
strategy to keep their distance from lowland states (J. C. Scott 2009, 220–237).  However, 
the Lahu case offers possibilities for a different interpretation of the myths.
The Lahu myth relates that the creator god once summoned representatives from 
all ethnic groups to receive books of his teachings.  He gave the Lahu delegation rice
cakes on which his teachings were inscribed.  However, on their way home, the Lahu
got hungry and ate all the rice cakes.  That is why the Lahu, unlike the Tay and the Han
Chinese who did not lose their books, do not possess their own writings (Antisdel 1911,
34; Pun and Lewis 2002, 24–25).
Some Lahu interpreted the myth to mean that they did not need to learn how to 
write.  “Because the Lahu people had eaten God’s rice cakes, they have God’s word in
their hearts.  Just as the Lahu said then, even though they do not have writing, to this
day God’s customs and words are in their hearts” (Pun and Lewis 2002, 25).  In this 
interpretation, the Lahu are congenitally literate while the Tay and Chinese acquire 
 literacy only through learning.  Here the hierarchical order of literacy-illiteracy between
valley dwellers and highlanders is reversed.  Highlanders can use the myth of “the lost
book” as an antithesis to the established authority of lowland states.
However, in another interpretation, the myth of “the lost book” provides a strong
basis for messianic prophecy.  Antisdel (1911, 34) reported:
There is a prophecy among the Lahoos (Lahu) that their brethren of the ninety-nine families 
will some day return to them and when they do will bring the written precepts of God which the 
Lahoos once had.  Tradition says God wrote his precepts on rice cakes and gave them to the 
people, but they became very hungry and ate the rice cakes.  The Akhas and Was (Karens also) 
41) Ma (2004; 2008; 2009) also argues that the Lahu ethnic consciousness has been formulated in the
process of modern state formation, and that their narrative of their own countries in former days
has been reinterpreted via the reconstruction and manipulation of origin myths.
42) “Weapons of the weak” is a keyword of his previous work (1985), and this theme is latently repeated
in The Art of Not Being Governed (2009).
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have similar traditions except that the writings were on buffalo skins, but when the people were 
hungry these were cooked and eaten.
They, as well as the Lahoos, expect a return of lost brethren, who will not only bring back the 
lost writings, but will restore them to political supremacy.
As founder of the Lahu messianic movements, San Fo Zu is thought to have been
the man who uttered the prophecy mentioned above.  According to the history of the
Lahu Christian church, San Fo Zu is reported to have made the following prediction:
[W]hen the time is fulfilled, God will search for us and will enter our homes.  There is a sign 
and when it appears, we will know that God is coming.  The sign is that white people on white 
horses will bring us the Scripture of God. (Saw Aung Din and Sowards 1963, 409)
The Lahu church historian Yo han refers to this prophecy in his version of Lahu
church history.  His version offers the terms “chaw hpu” and “mvuh hpu (white book)” 
as the Lahu translation of “white people” and “the Scripture of God” (Yo han 1976, 5).
Here the term hpu (white) is an adjective that stresses sacredness, so it is questionable
whether “white men” and “white book” originally denoted Westerners and the Bible.
When the American Baptist missionary William M. Young started his evangelical
work in Keng Tung in 1901, the Lahu regarded him as the “white man” of the prophecy
who was bringing God’s precepts (“white book”) back to them.  His arrival started a mass 
conversion movement in 1904 in Keng Tung, and the movement soon spread across the 
border into China at an increasingly fast pace (Saw Aung Din and Sowards 1963, 410–411).
William Young noted that the belief in “the lost book” underlay the enthusiasm for the
messianic movement at that time: “[t]he belief seems well-nigh universal among them 
that the foreigner would bring them the knowledge of the true God, and there is an 
intense longing on the part of many for such a revelation” (W. M. Young 1905b).  The
word “foreigner” here was most probably a translation (somewhat exaggerated) of the
Lahu term for white people—chaw hpu.
William Young was originally trained for missionary work amongst the Tay (Shan).
He was fluent in the Tay (Shan) language and, quite naturally, he knew no Lahu.  In mis-
sionary correspondences he repeatedly complained that he had some difficulty in com-
municating with the Lahu, for every time he received delegations of the Lahu he had to
find somebody who could translate his Tay into Lahu.  Of course, “the white books” that
he brought were not written in Lahu but Tay translations of gospels and tracts.  Christian 
missionaries developed romanized Lahu script for Bible translation later.  In 1907, Tilbe, 
a Baptist missionary, invented a romanization system for Lahu, which was used in some 
pamphlets, catechism, and hymns (Anonymous 1907, 5).  Later, in 1932, Po Tun and 
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Telford completed a translation of the New Testament (Saw Aung Din and Sowards 1963, 
414).  The invention of a romanization system and the translation of the Bible into Lahu
started only after the mass conversions of 1904.  Therefore the Lahu could not have had
a writing system during the initial period of mass conversion.
Nicholas Tapp (1989) generalized that messianic mass conversion to Christianity
was inspired by the widely shared myth of “the lost book” among the highlanders (Miao,
Karen, etc.) of mainland Southeast Asia, and hypothesized that conversions were moti-
vated by a “desire for literacy.”  Literacy in this context refers to translations of the Bible 
and other texts written in scripts of their own languages.  However, his hypothesis can-
not be sustained when we consider the fact that in each case, mass conversion occurred
before the translation of the Bible.43)  Actually, the Bibles distributed by the missionaries 
were not written in the languages of the highlanders, but in the scripts of dominant 
 lowlanders—Chinese for the Miao and Burmese for the Karen.  Nevertheless, these 
Bibles were regarded as evidence that the prophecies concerning the return of “the lost
book” had been fulfilled.  The Lahu case was by no means an exception.  The Bible that
they received was not written in Lahu but in the Tay language.
What then was the real motivation behind their desire to redeem “the lost book”?
William Young mentions some interesting attitudes that the Lahu displayed toward 
 written texts.  In a correspondence dated November 5, 1904, he wrote of Lahu “teachers
(or travelling evangelists)”:
These Muhso (Lahu) teachers have a wonderful influence over the people.  They cannot read, 
they carry certain papers covered with Heiroglyphic44) marks that they do not understand the
meaning of themselves.  I think it quite probable that some of their head teachers in China could 
interpret these peculiar papers and give some meaning to everything.45)
Apparently “teacher” in this context denotes prophets of the cult of San Fo Zu’s
messianic movement.  It is quite probable that the term “Heiroglyphic” refers to Chinese 
characters.  These illiterate religious specialists carried mysterious texts written in the
language of another ethnic group around with them.  These texts seem to have been 
highly valued even though the owners could not read them.  In another correspondence
William Young commented:
43) The first Miao and Karen scripts were developed by the missionaries in 1917 (Pollard 1919, 173) 
and 1832 (U Zan and Sowards 1963, 312) respectively.  In both cases the conversion movements 
preceded the invention of the scripts.
44) This should be “Hieroglyphic.”
45) W. M. Young to T. S. Barbour, Nov. 5, 1904.
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The Muhso tradition regarding the lost Book and their longing for the Foreigner to bring them 
the true Law makes it possible for us to use tracts and Gospels to great advantage even where the 
people cannot read.  Many Muhso believe that their language was a written language.  Some claim 
that there are books still extant.  They brought me a book some time ago that they hoped might 
be such a book but it turned out to be a Chinese book on Astrology and evil spirit worship . . . .46)
Again, “foreigner” in his context corresponds to the “white people (chaw hpu)” 
mentioned in the original prophecy.  He goes on to say:
We send out tracts and Gospels to the Villagers and they receive them at once as the fulfill-
ment of their traditions.  I have sent out hundreds of Gospels and some thousands of tracts.  It is 
somewhat amusing to see a group coming in 15 or 20 days journey and unfold a tract or Gospel 
that has been guarded with scrupulous care.  Wherever they receive those tracts and Gospels they 
are anxious to come to us at once.  The literature has reached far over into China.  Wherever they 
have received the literature it gives us a sort of “Squatter sovereignty right to the territory.”47)
William Young clearly stated that the tracts and gospels in Tay were not read by the 
receivers.  Rather, written scriptures themselves were revered as objects of worship,
and the receivers of such texts treated them as if they were some kind of amulet.  As
already noted above, “squatter sovereignty” could be a translation of jaw maw or king. 
This demonstrates that the Lahu conceived of the texts as objectifications of super natural 
power, and that they regarded people with such power as entitled to be invested as kings. 
Messianic movements to redeem “the lost book” are not an anarchist’s antithesis to the 
state but a unique manifestation of state and power, especially charismatic kingship.  In
other words, we can interpret Lahu mythical accounts as articulating a deep-felt longing
to possess their own state and king, rather than indicating a desire to reject them.
V Conclusion
As documented by Qing officials in the early nineteenth century, the Lahu were once
notorious for their refusal to submit to imperial rule.  This does not, however, mean that
they enjoyed complete freedom from state control.  Their struggle since the eighteenth
century shows their efforts to establish their own state, and indeed they sometimes suc-
ceeded in their endeavors.  Nonetheless, their polities or states were ultimately elimi-
nated and incorporated into modern nation states with demarcated borderlines.  In this
sense, the Lahu became stateless and conscious of the loss of their own state only after
46) W. M. Young to T. S. Barbour, Apr. 4, 1905.
47) ibid.
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the process of modern state formation began.
Actually the Lahu had formulated their unique concepts of state and kingship over
the course of their history.  These concepts have not been considered seriously by 
scholars because they are so radically different from conventional understanding of state 
and kingship.48)  Invisibility of Lahu states and kings in previous academic works is due
to our inability to identify them, rather than because the Lahu rejected such notions 
themselves.
Ironically James Scott’s argument, which is clearly on the side of anti-state anar-
chism, echoes the assessment by Cen Yuying, the late nineteenth-century governor-
general of Yunnan and Guizhou.  Both men view the history of the Lahu as one of 
“endless rebellion,” and both fail to recognize the concept of state and kingship that 
underpinned “rebellions” by highlanders.
The Lahu oral tradition has extremely rich texts that justify their statelessness.  The 
lost kings, the lost countries, and “the lost book” are different versions of the same 
theme.  Nevertheless, what these narratives stress is that in the past, the Lahu owned
their states, and that by no means do they negate the notion of a state or want to avoid
living in their own state.  “The lost book” narrated in their messianic movements has
been interpreted as a manifestation of their anarchist tendencies.  On the contrary, the
reality of their behavior at the time of the mass conversions clearly demonstrates their
original concept of, and longing for, an ideal king.
At first glance the history of the Lahu seems to be that of a typically stateless people 
in the James Scott’s sense of the term.  However, a close reading of the narrative of their 
history and mythical accounts leads us to quite a different conclusion:49) what is really 
missing is an adequate framework for the understanding of their indigenous concepts of 
state, kingship, and power.  The Lahu appear to be an essentially stateless people simply
because our conceptual tools for the comprehension of the “inside view” of marginalized
ethnic groups are far from adequate at present.
Accepted: October 5, 2012
48) In his argument on early state formation in Southeast Asia, Wolters (1982, 12–14) criticizes the 
tendency of previous scholars to overlook small-scale native state formation because of a bias toward 
Western or Chinese state models.  Unfortunately, however, he omits the mainland Southeast Asian 
massif from his hypothesis (ibid., 32).
49) Although J. Scott has exaggerated the statelessness of the “Zomia” people in his book, I agree with 
some points in his argument, namely that: 1) “Zomia” peoples’ religious belief and mythical accounts 
reflect the theodicy of their history of deprivation; and 2) the ultimate goal of millenarianism of the 
“Zomia” people could be the total negation of any form of state-like social hierarchy, rather than 
their own state-building.  For details of my argument on this point, see Kataoka (2007).
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